Abstract-We study bottleneck routing games where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion on any edge in the network. Bottleneck games have been studied in the literature by having the player's utility costs to be determined by the worst congested edge in their paths. However, the Nash equilibria of such games are inefficient since the price of anarchy can be very high with respect to the parameters of the game. In order to obtain smaller price of anarchy we explore exponential bottleneck games where the utility costs of the players are exponential functions on the congestion of the edges in their paths. We find that exponential bottleneck games are very efficient giving a poly-log bound on the price of anarchy: O(log L · log |E|), where L is the largest path length in the players strategy sets and E is the set of edges in the graph.
I. INTRODUCTION
Motivated by the selfish behavior of entities in communication networks, we study routing games in general networks where each packet's path is controlled independently by a selfish player. We consider noncooperative games with N players, where each player has a pure strategy profile from which it selfishly selects a single path from a source node to a destination node such that the selected path minimizes the player's utility cost function (such games are also known as atomic or unsplittable-flow games). We focus on bottleneck games where the objective for the social outcome is to minimize C, the maximum congestion on any edge in the network. Typically, the congestion on an edge is a non-decreasing function on the number of paths that use the edge; here, we consider the congestion to be simply the number of paths that use the edge.
Bottleneck congestion games have been studied in the literature [1] - [4] where each player's utility cost is the worst congestion on its path edges. In particular, player i has utility cost function max e∈pi C e where p i is the path of the player and C e denotes the congestion of edge e. In [1] the authors observe that bottleneck games are important in networks for various practical reasons. In wireless networks the maximum congested edge is related to the lifetime of the network since the nodes adjacent to high congestion edges transmit large number of packets which results to higher energy utilization. Thus, minimizing the maximum edge congestion immediately translates to longer network lifetime. High congestion edges also result to congestion hot-spots in the network which may slow down the performance of the whole network. Hot spots may also increase the vulnerability of the network to malicious attacks which aim to to increase the congestion of edges in the hope to bring down the network or degrade its performance. Thus, minimizing the maximum congested edge results to hotspot avoidance and also to more secure networks.
Bottleneck games are also important from a theoretical point of view since the maximum edge congestion is immediately related to the optimal packet scheduling. In a seminal result, Leighton et al. [5] showed that there exist packet scheduling algorithms that can deliver the packets along their chosen paths in time very close to C + D, where D is the maximum chosen path length. This work on packet scheduling has been extended in [5] - [9] . When C ≫ D, the congestion becomes the dominant factor in the packet scheduling performance. Thus, smaller C immediately implies faster delivery time for the packets in the network.
A natural problem that arises concerns the effect of the players' selfishness on the welfare of the whole network measured with the social cost C. We examine the consequence of the selfish behavior in pure Nash equilibria which are stable states of the game in which no player can unilaterally improve her situation. We quantify the effect of selfishness with the price of anarchy (P oA) [10] , [11] , which expresses how much larger is the worst social cost in a Nash equilibrium compared to the social cost in the optimal coordinated solution. The price of anarchy provides a measure for estimating how closely do Nash equilibria of bottleneck routing games approximate the optimal C * of the respective routing optimization problem. Ideally, the price of anarchy should be small. However, the findings in the literature show that bottleneck games are not efficient, namely, the price of anarchy may be large. In [1] it is shown that if the edge-congestion function is bounded by some polynomial with degree d (with respect to the packets that use the edge) then P oA = O(|E| d ), where E is the set of edges in the graph. In [2] the authors consider the case d = 1 and they show that P oA = O(L + log |V |), where L is the maximum path length in the players strategies and V is the set of nodes. This bound is asymptotically tight since there are game instances with P oA = Ω(L). Note that L ≤ |E|, and further L may be significantly smaller than |E|. However, L can still be proportional to the size of the graph, and thus the price of anarchy can be large.
A. Contributions
In this work we focus on exploring alternative utility cost functions for the players that have better impact on the social cost C. We introduce exponential bottleneck games where the player utilities are exponential functions on the congestion of the edges of the paths. In particular, the player utility cost function for player i is:
where p i is the player's chosen path. Note that the new utility cost is a sum of exponential terms on the congestion of the edges in the path (instead of the max that we described earlier). Using the new utility cost functions we show that exponential games have always Nash equilibria which can be obtained by best response dynamics. The main result is that the price of anarchy is poly-log:
where L is the maximum path length in the players strategy set and E is the set of edges in the graph. This price of anarchy bound is a significant improvement over the price of anarchy from the regular utility cost functions described earlier.
Exponential cost functions are legitimate metrics for the utility costs of players since they reflect the performance of the chosen paths according to congestion. Each player is motivated to select a path with lower utility cost since it will provide a better quality path with lower congestion that can affect positively the player's performance. As we discuss in Section V, the reason that we use exponential cost functions instead of polynomial ones is that low degree polynomials give high price of anarchy.
B. Related Work
Congestion games were introduced and studied in [12] , [13] . Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [10] introduced the notion of price of anarchy in the specific parallel link networks model in which they provide the bound P oA = 3/2. Since then, many routing and congestion game models have been studied which are distinguished by the network topology, cost functions, type of traffic (atomic or splittable), and kind of equilibria (pure or mixed). Roughgarden and Tardos [14] provided the first result for splittable flows in general networks in which they showed that P oA ≤ 4/3 for a player cost which reflects to the sum of congestions of the edges of a path. Pure equilibria with atomic flow have been studied in [2] , [13] , [15] - [17] (our work fits into this category), and with splittable flow in [14] , [18] - [20] . Mixed equilibria with atomic flow have been studied in [10] , [11] , [21] - [29] , and with splittable flow in [30] , [31] .
Most of the work in the literature uses a cost metric measured as the sum of congestions of all the edges of the player's path [14] , [15] , [17] , [19] , [20] , [26] . Our work differs from these approaches since we adopt the exponential metric for player cost. The vast majority of the work on routing games has been performed for parallel link networks, with only a few exceptions on general network topologies [2] , [15] , [18] , [30] , which we consider here.
Our work is close to [2] , where the authors consider the player cost C i and social cost C. They prove that the price of stability is 1. They show that the price of anarchy is bounded by O(L+log n), where L is the maximum allowed path length. They also prove that κ ≤ P oA ≤ c(κ 2 + log 2 n), where κ is the size of the largest edge-simple cycle in the graph and c is a constant. Some of the techniques that we use in our proofs (for example expansion) were introduced in [2] . Another related result for general networks which has a brief discussion of the convergence of maximum player cost (C i ) games is [16] where the authors focus on parallel link networks, but also give some results for general topologies on convergence to equilibria.
Bottleneck congestion games have been studied in [1] , where the authors consider the maximum congestion metric in general networks with splittable and atomic flow (but without considering path lengths). They prove the existence and non-uniqueness of equilibria in both the splittable and atomic flow models. They show that finding the best Nash equilibrium that minimizes the social cost is a NP-hard problem. Further, they show that the price of anarchy may be unbounded for specific edge congestion functions (these are functions of the number of paths that use the edge). If the edge congestion function is polynomial with degree p then they bound the price of anarchy with O(m p ), where m is the number of edges in the graph. In the splittable case they show that if the users always follow paths with low congestion then the equilibrium achieves optimal social cost.
Outline of Paper
In Section II we give basic definitions. In section III we show that exponential bottleneck games have always Nash equilibria. We study the price of anarchy in Section IV. We finish with conclusions and future work in Section V.
II. DEFINITIONS

A. Path Routings
Consider an arbitrary graph G = (V, E) with nodes V and edges E. Let Π = {π 1 , . . . , π N } be a set of packets such that each π i has a source u i and destination
is a collection of paths, where p i is a path for packet π i from u i to v i . We will denote by E(p i ) the set of edges in path p i . Consider a particular routing p. The edgecongestion of an edge e, denoted C e , is the number of paths in p that use edge e. For any set of edges A ⊆ E, we will denote by C A = max e∈A C e . For any path q, the path-congestion is C q = C E(q) . For any path p i ∈ p, we will also use the notation C i = C pi . The network congestion is C = C E , which is the maximum edge-congestion over all edges in E.
We continue with definitions of exponential functions on congestion. Consider a routing p. For any edge e, we will denote C e = 2
Ce . For any set of edges A ⊆ E, we will denote C A = e∈A C e . For any path q, we will denote C q = C E(q) .
For any path p i ∈ p we will denote C i = C pi . We denote the length (number of edges) of any path q as |q|. Whenever necessary we will append (p) in the above definitions to signify the dependance on routing p. For example, we will write C(p) instead of C.
B. Routing Games
A routing game in graph G is a tuple R = (G, N , P), where N = {1, 2, . . . , N } is the set of players such that each player i corresponds to a packet π i with source u i and destination v i , and P are the strategies of the players. We will use the notation π i to denote player i and its respective packet. In the set P = i∈N P i the subset P i denotes the strategy set of player π i which a collection of available paths in G for player π i from u i to v i . Any path p ∈ P i is a pure strategy available to player π i . A pure strategy profile is any routing p = [p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p N ], where p i ∈ P i . The longest path length in P is denoted L(P) = max p∈P |p|. (When the context is clear we will simply write L).
For game R and routing p, the social cost (or global cost) is a function of routing p, and it is denoted SC(p). The player or local cost is also a function on p denoted pc i (p). We use the standard notation p −i to refer to the collection of paths {p 1 , · · · , p i−1 , p i+1 , · · · , p N }, and (p i ; p −i ) as an alternative notation for p which emphasizes the dependence on p i . Player π i is locally optimal (or stable) in routing p if
A greedy move by a player π i is any change of its path from p i to p
Best response dynamics are sequences of greedy moves by players.
A routing p is in a Nash Equilibrium (we say p is a Nash-routing) if every player is locally optimal. Nash-routings quantify the notion of a stable selfish outcome. In the games that we study there could exist multiple Nash-routings. A routing p * is an optimal pure strategy profile if it has minimum attainable social cost: for any other pure strategy profile p, SC(p * ) ≤ SC(p). We quantify the quality of the Nash-routings with the price of anarchy (P oA) (sometimes referred to as the coordination ratio) and the price of stability (P oS). Let P denote the set of distinct Nash-routings, and let SC * denote the social cost of an optimal routing p * . Then,
III. EXPONENTIAL BOTTLENECK GAMES AND THEIR STABILITY
Let R = (G, N , P) be a routing game such that for any routing p the social cost function is SC = C, and the player cost function is pc i = C i . We refer to such routing games as exponential bottleneck games.
We show that exponential games have always Nash-routings. We also show that there are instances of exponential games that have multiple Nash-routings. The existence of Nash routings relies on finding an appropriate potential function that provides an ordering of the routings. Given an arbitrary initial state a greedy move of a player can only give a new routing with smaller order. Thus, best response dynamics (repeated greedy moves) converge to a routing where no player can improve further, namely, they converge to a Nash-routing. The potential function that we will use is: f (p) = C E (p). We show that any greedy move gives a new routing with lower potential.
Lemma 3.1: If in routing p a player π i performs a greedy move, then the resulting routing p ′ has C E (p) > C E (p ′ ). Proof: Suppose that player π i has path p i ∈ p and switches to path p
, since the presence or absence of player's π path in the edges A and B alters their total cost by a factor of 2. Let H = E \ {A ∪ B}. We have that
, since π i does not affect those edges. Since E = H ∪ A ∪ B and H, A, B are disjoint, we have that
, as needed. Since the result of the potential function cannot be smaller than zero, Lemma 3.1 implies that best response dynamics converge to Nash-routings. Thus, we have: Theorem 3.2: Every exponential game instance R = (G, N , P) has a Nash-routing.
Nash-routing p Nash-routing p ′ We continue to show that there are exponential games with multiple Nash-routings. Consider the example of Figure  1 . There are three players π 1 , π 2 , π 3 with respective sources u 1 , u 2 , u 3 and destinations v 1 , v 2 , v 3 . The strategy set of each player are all feasible paths from their source to destination. In the left part of Figure 1 is a Nash-routing p = [p 1 , p 2 , p 3 ] with social cost SC(p) = 2 and respective player costs pc 1 (p) = 4, pc 2 (p) = 8, and pc 3 (p) = 6. On the right part of the same figure is another Nash-routing The players in S ′ may not be self-sufficient either. This process is repeated until a self-sufficient set is found. Our goal is to find a lower bound on a self-sufficient set players. We start with a small set of players based onĈ and the optimal congestion value C * , prove they are not self-sufficient and consider a sequence of expansions that will eventually lead to a self-sufficient set. We find the minimum number of these expansions to terminate the process and thus find the minimum number of players (and edges) needed to support a maximum equilibrium congestion ofĈ. For a given graph G and players/edges this gives us an upper bound onĈ relative to C * . Initially assume C * = 1, i.e every player in the optimally congested network has a unique optimal path to its destination of length at most L * . For the gameĜ we will consider sets of players in stages, depending on their costs inĜ. Let S (i) denote the set of players in stage i, 1 ≤ i ≤Ĉ with player costsC :
. Consider an arbitrary player π in stage i. We let P * denote its optimal path and Φ(P * ) the minimum cost of path P * inĜ. Since Π is in equilibrium, we must have Φ(P * ) > 2Ĉ −i−1 . We formally define expansion chains as follows: In stage i,
denote the set of all players occupying exactly one edge of congestionĈ − i + 1, let B (i) denote the set of all players whose maximum edge congestion
−B (i) . For i > 1, a level i expansion chain consists of a single chain of nodes r → X i+1 (r) → X i+2 (r) → . . ., where the root node r represents the players of {B (i) , D (i) }. Thus there are two possible expansion chains rooted at level i, except for level 1, where A
(1) can also be the root node for a third expansion chain. The rest of the chain consists of a sequence of nodes such that node X i+k (r) represents the support set of players of node X i+k−1 (r).
We first show below, a sufficient condition onĈ for expansion chains to exist at any stage. For technical reasons, we will use l * 
, which is strictly less than the minimum required cost of an optimal path Φ(P * )+1. Next consider the set B (i) . Assume for purposes of contradiction that B (i) is self-sufficient, i.e there are a sufficient number of edges composed exclusively of players in B (i) that are also on all the optimal paths of B (i) and each optimal path has cost at least Φ(P * )+1. Let B is bounded by 2Ĉ −i+1 , we must havê
Since B (i) is in equilibrium, each of the |B (i) | optimal paths has cost > Φ(P * ). For j ≥ 1, each edge e ∈ B (i) j on an optimal path P * opt contributes Φ(P * )/2 j−1 towards the cost of this path.
(Each edge in B
0 contributes Φ(P * )). Now using the fact that
We note the following: edges of congestion ≤Ĉ−i−l * 1 −3 must account for less than half the cost of any optimal path on which they are present. The maximum contribution of such edges over L * −1 edges of the optimal path is Φ(P * )/2, implying that there must be one edge of higher congestion (≥Ĉ −i−l * 1 −2) that contributes more than half of the required total cost ≥ Φ(P * )+1. Thus we must havê
and therefore Eq. 2 becomes
Comparing Eq. 4 with Eq. 1, we get
Since |B (i) j | > 0 for at least some j : 1 ≤ j ≤ l * 1 + 2, Eq. 5 is impossible for (Ĉ − i) > l * 1 + 10, which contradicts the assumption that B (i) is self-sufficient. Finally for the case of players from A (i) , each subset of C−i+1 players shares an edge. Thus the maximum number of optimal edges available from within the set is |A (i) |/(Ĉ−i+1). Since this is much less than the number of optimal paths |A (i) |, players in A (i) are also not self-sufficient. Concluding, none of the player sets {A (i) , B (i) , D (i) } are self-sufficient and hence either these players are on the expansion chains of some other players or there are expansion chains rooted at these players in stage i : 1 ≤ i ≤Ĉ −l * −11. The above lemma guarantees the existence of at least one expansion chain rooted at stage 1 whenĈ = O(l * ). We now want to find the minimum number of edges required to support the game with equilibrium cost 2Ĉ . This corresponds to finding the smallest expansion chain rooted at stage 1. By our definition, an expansion chain consists of new players occupying the expansion edges of players on the previous levels. It would seem that chains should consist of type B players since they occupy multiple edges and thus fewer players are required. However as the lemma below shows it is players of type A that minimize the expansion edges.
Consider an arbitrary player π of type B inĜ occupying edges E = {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e k } of non-increasing congestion c 1 ≥ c 2 ≥ . . . c k that are optimal edges (expansion edges) of other players, where we assume maximum congestion c 1 ≥ 2. We want to answer the following question: Is there an alternate equilibrium/game containing player(s) with the same total equilibrium cost as π, but requiring fewer edges to support this equilibrium cost. Note that when comparing these two games, the actual routing paths (i.e source-destinations) do not have to be the same. All we need to show is the existence of an alternate game (even with different source-destination pairs for the players) that has the same equilibrium cost.
In particular, consider an alternate game G ′ in which π is replaced by a set P = {π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π k } of type A players occupying single edges of congestion c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c k , where π and the set P are also in equilibrium in their respective games. The equilibrium cost of π and set P is the same ( k j=1 2 cj ) as they are occupying edges of the same congestion. Since both π in gameĜ and the set of players P are in equilibrium and occupying expansion edges of other players in their respective games, C * = 1 implies they must have their own expansion edges in their respective games. Suppose we can show that the number of expansion edges required by the k players in P is at most those required by the single player of type B. Since π is an arbitrary type B player, this argument applied recursively implies that all expansion edges in the gameĜ should be occupied by type A players to minimize the total number of expansion edges. Thus we will have shown that any equilibrium with costĈ can be supported with fewer total players if they are of type A than if they are of type B. Let π * and P * denote the expansion edges of π and the set P respectively.
Lemma 4.4: |P * | ≤ |π * | for arbitrary players π and set P with the same equilibrium cost.
Proof: We prove this by strong induction on the length of player π's path. For the basis, assume player π is on path (e 1 , e 2 ) of length 2 inĜ, with edges of congestion c 1 and c 2 respectively, where c 1 ≥ c 2 . Simultaneously consider two players π 1 and π 2 on single edges in game G ′ with respective costs 2 c1 and 2 c2 . We need to show that every possible optimal path (i.e expansion edges) for π inĜ has two equivalent optimal paths (of the same or lower total cost) for the two players π 1 and π 2 in G ′ . Suppose the optimal path of π is π * = (e * ′ with appropriate endpoints, specifically, the endpoints of π * 1 and π * 2 will be the same as the endpoints of edge e 1 and e 2 in G ′ . Hence |P * | = |π * | in this case as desired.
Case 2 c * 1 ≥ c 1 : There are at least c 1 ≥ 2 players on player π's optimal path with costs ≥ 2 c1 . Since C * = 1, these players must have independent optimal paths of cost ≥ 2 c1−1 . Hence at least c 1 ≥ 2 such optimal paths are needed to support π in gameĜ. In contrast, in game G ′ , the two players π 1 and π 2 can be supported by two edges of congestion c 1 −1 and c 2 −1, respectively. Hence |P * | = 2 ≤ |π * | in this case as well. For the inductive hypothesis assume |P * | ≤ |π * | for all paths upto length k > 2. Consider player π occupying edges of nonincreasing congestion c 1 , . . . , c k+1 inĜ whose optimal path has edges of non-increasing congestion c * 1 , . . . , c * m . As before consider two cases, Case 1 c * 1 < c 1 : let j 1 and j 2 be the indices such that 1)
Note that since c * 1 < c 1 , indices j 1 and j 2 exist with j 1 < j 2 ≤ m. Instead of player π consider two new players P 1 and P 2 , where P 1 occupies two edges of congestion c 1 and c 2 and P 2 occupies edges of congestion c 3 , c 4 . . . c k+1 . From above, j 2 edges are required to satisfy P 1 and P 2 and |π * | = m ≥ j 2 . Players P 1 and P 2 have path lengths < k and thus by the inductive hypothesis, the number of expansion edges P * required to support P 1 and P 2 assuming they were replaced by type A players satisfies |P
. Clearly j exists since c * 1 ≥ c 1 . Now instead of player π, consider two players P 1 and P 2 with P 1 occupying edges of congestion c 1 , c 2 , . . . c j and P 2 occupying edges of congestion c j+1 , . . . c m , respectively. The edge of congestion c * 1 can satisfy P 1 while the remaining edges of the optimal path π * can satisfy P 2 . As in the previous case, players P 1 and P 2 have path lengths < k and thus by the inductive hypothesis, the number of expansion edges P * required to support P 1 and P 2 assuming they were replaced by type A players satisfies |P * | ≤ |π * | as desired. The case when m = 1 is omitted for brevity.
As a consequence of lemma 4.4, we have Lemma 4.5: ForĈ > l * +11, the expansion chain rooted in stage 1 and occupying the minimum number of edges consists only of players of type A (other than the root).
Next we derive the size of the smallest network required to support an equilibrium congestion ofĈ. Without loss of generality, we assume there exists at least one type A player in stage 1, i.e a single edge of congestionĈ and derive the minimum chain rooted at A (1) . From lemma 4.5, there exists an expansion chain rooted at A (1) with only type A players. Among all such expansion chains, the one with the minimum number of players (equivalently edges, since each type A player occupies a single edge) is defined below. Theorem 4.6: EC min , the expansion chain with minimum number of edges that supports a self-sufficient equilibrium rooted at A (1) is defined by EC min :
Every player in EC min has an optimal path whose length is the maximum allowed L * . The depth of chain EC min is O(Ĉ/l * ).
For technical reasons, we don't terminate EC min with players from A (Ĉ) i.e single edges of congestion 1. Such a network can be shown to be unstable (i.e no equilibrium exists). Rather, the optimal paths of players from A (Ĉ−1) (i.e with player cost 4) are of length 2 with congestion 0 inĜ. This does not affect our count of the total number of edges required to derive the P oA below. We need a lower bound on the number of edges to derive an upper bound on the P oA, so (under)counting EC min only upto stage A (Ĉ−1) is acceptable for our purposes. To prove this theorem, we need a couple of technical lemmas which determine the minimum rate of expansion of an expansion chain. We describe these lemmas using the preliminary setup below. Let π denote the set ofĈ −i+1 players occupying a single edge in A (i) , for some i ≥ 1. Let π m ∈ π denote an arbitrary player with π * m = (e 1 , e 2 , . . . e k ) denoting π m 's optimal path, where k ≤ L * . For the moment, assume all edges on π * m have the same congestion c. We first note that the largest stage from which type A players can support π m is i + l * + 1 since the player cost is P C m = 2Ĉ −i+1 and we must have k · 2 c ≥ 2Ĉ
we must have congestion c ≥Ĉ − i − l * and the largest stage where this is possible is stage i+l * +1. Now consider the two (partial) expansion chains Proof: First consider EC 1 . Since |π| =Ĉ − i + 1 and C * = 1, there areĈ − i + 1 optimal paths at the first expansion stage of EC 1 . Each optimal path length is the longest allowed i.e 2 l * . ClearlyĈ − i − l * players on each edge of each such path are enough to support the equilibrium cost of π. Thus the total of expansion edges in EC 1 is (Ĉ − i + 1)2 l * . For EC 2 , again there areĈ − i + 1 optimal paths at the first expansion stage. However each edge of each optimal path now has congestionĈ −i−j+1. Each optimal path must have length
Thus the total number of edges at this stage of EC 2 is at least (Ĉ − i + 1)2 j−1 while the total number of players is at least (Ĉ −i+1)(Ĉ −i−j +1)2 j−1 . Each of these players has its own optimal path, with each edge on a path having congestionĈ − i − l * , by definition of EC 2 . The cost of each optimal path must be at least 2Ĉ −i−j and so the length l of each such path is at least 2 l * −j since l·2Ĉ
Thus the total number of edges in this stage of EC 2 is at least (Ĉ − i + 1)(Ĉ − i − j + 1)2 j−1 2 l * −j . Adding the edges in both stages and simplifying, we get the overall number of edges required to support the equilibrium of π in EC 2 as
Using the fact thatĈ ≥ i + j + 1 by definition of expansion, we can see that the number of edges in EC 2 is at least as much as
Now consider the two (partial) expansion chains
(Note that the condition on j + k is because one cannot directly expand beyond l * + 1 stages due to the maximum optimal path length constraint). Due to space constraints, we skip the proof which counts edges similar to the previous lemma. The proof of Theorem 4.6 follows from lemmas 4.7-4.8, using the fact that starting from any stage i, the minimum cost expansion arises by selecting players from stage i + l * + 1 to occupy expansion edges, with all optimal path lengths being the maximum possible L * . Due to space constraints, we omit a formal proof by induction for showing that the number of expansion edges is minimized when all edges on an optimal path have the same congestion.
EC min defined in Theorem 4.6 is also the minimum sized chain when the root players are from B (1) or D (1) although the number of edges required in the supporting graph is slightly different as we see later. In these cases, all stages (other than the root) in the minimum expansion chain consist of type A players by lemma 4.5 and the proof of Theorem 4.6 is immediately applicable in choosing the specific indices of the expansion stages required to support the equilibrium). As we will show later, the P oA is maximized when the chain is rooted at A (1) . Theorem 4.9: When C * = 1, the upper bound κ on the Price of Anarchy P oA of gameĜ is given by the minimum of 1)
To obtain an upper bound on the P oA, we want to find the smallest graph that can support an equilibrium cost of 2Ĉ . Since the optimal path length L * can range from O(1) to O(|E|), we evaluate smallness both in terms of path length and number of edges.
Clearly, in the case when there is no expansion inĜ, the Price of Anarchy is O(log L * ), since by lemma 4.3,Ĉ ≤ l * 1 + 11 and the P oA =Ĉ/C * = O(log L * ). Consider the case when there is expansion in the network i.eĈ >> log L * . To bound the P oA, we will compute the number of edges in the minimum sized expansion chain. First assume there exists a single edge of congestionĈ (labeled as player set π) and exactly one expansion chain EC min : π → A (l * +2) → A (2l * +3) → . . . in the graph i.e the only players in the graph are those required to be on the expansion edges of EC min . Using the standard notion of depth, the node corresponding to the player set A
on EC min is defined to be at depth k, with the root node at depth 0. At a given depth k, we define the following notations: Let E k denote the total number of expansion edges at depth k (i.e the edges on comprising the optimal paths of players at depth k − 1), P k denote the minimum number of players who require players from p k+1 on their optimal paths and C k denote the congestion on any expansion edge.
At depth 0, we have E 0 = 1 (a single edge e of congestion C 0 =Ĉ) Note that P 0 =Ĉ − 1. Even though we havê C players, one of these players might have its optimal path coincident with edge e. However for all k > 0, P k = E k C k since all the edges in E k are already optimal edges of players from P k−1 . We also have C k =Ĉ − kl * − k (by definition of type A congestion), and finally E k = P k−1 L * , since every packet in P k−1 has its own optimal path (C * = 1) and every optimal path on EC min is of length L * . Putting these together, we obtain a recursive definition of
We terminate our evaluation of the expansion chain when expansion edges have a congestion of 2, i.eĈ −kl * −k = 2 which implies a depth of d = (Ĉ − 2)/(l * + 1). For technical reasons, we don't terminate the chain with players from A (Ĉ) i.e single edges of congestion 1. Such a network can be shown to be unstable (i,e no equilibrium exists. Rather, the optimal paths of players from A (Ĉ−1) (i.e with player cost 4) are of length 2 with congestion 0 inĜ. This does not significantly affect our count of the total number of edges required to derive the P oA below.
Thus the total number of edges in EC min is bounded by
With some algebraic manipulations, we can bound Eq. 7 as
Let |E| denote the actual number of edges in graph G. Since C * = 1, the Price of Anarchy isĈ. Using κ to denote the upper bound on the P oA and simplifying, we get κ(log(κL
Hence the P oA is bounded by a polylog function of log |E| in the worst case. Can we get a larger upper bound on the P OA if the expansion chain is rooted at B
(1) /D (1) instead of A (1) ? To examine this, letĈ − q be the largest congestion inĜ, q > 0. We need 2 q such edges in order to satisfy the maximum player cost of 2Ĉ. All these edges can be used as expansion edges for other players. From the analysis in Theorem 4.9, we note that expansion between stages occurs at a factorial rate. Thus using these 2 q edges as high up in the chain as possible (thereby reducing the need for new expansion edges) will minimize the expansion rate. The best choice for q then is l * . In this case, we have a single player π m in equilibrium inĜ, occupying L * edges of congestionĈ − l * . These L * edges are also the optimal edges of π m , i.e its equilibrium and optimal paths are identical. Hence the first stage of expansion in this chain is for the L * (Ĉ − l * − 1) players on the L * edges of π m . From this point on the minimum sized chain for this graph is identical to the minimum sized chain EC min defined above. The total number of edges in this chain can be computed in a manner similar to above. While the number of edges is smaller than EC min , it can be shown that the P oA is also smaller C − l * . Hence the upper bound on the P oA is obtained using an expansion chain rooted at A (1) . So far we have assumed the optimal bottleneck congestion C * = 1 in our derivations. We now show that increasing C * decreases the P oA and hence the previous derivation is the upper bound. We first evaluate the impact of C * = M > 1 on expansion chains. Having C * > 1 implies that more players can share expansion edges and thus the rate of expansion as well as the depth of an expansion chain (if it exists) should decrease. We first show that expansion chains exist even for arbitrary C * = M . Lemma 4.10: Given a non-empty player set X 
Proof: We provide a brief outline of the proof. First consider the case of players from A (i) . As before, the maximum number of optimal edges available from within the set is
. However each group of M players could have their optimal paths (of length one) on one such edge. Thus the number of distinct optimal paths (edges) required is only
are in a self-sustained equilibrium. This is not true for the given value of i in the lemma and hence there must be an expansion chain rooted at A (i) . Similarly for the case of players from B (i) , the main modification from 4.3 is in Eq. 2 which now becomes
for making B (i) self-sustained since the set of B (i) players only need |B (i) |/M optimal paths. Following the same derivation as in lemma 4.3, Eq. 5 becomes
For the given values of i and 1 ≤ j ≤ l * 1 +2, this is impossible and hence B (i) must participate in an expansion chain. The arguments for D (i) are similar to lemma 4.3. Similarly Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5 can be suitably modified and the minimum sized chain in this case has the same structure as defined in Theorem 4.6. Analogous to the C * = 1 case, the maximum P oA occurs when EC min is rooted at A (1) . We calculate this P oA with C * = M , below. Proof: SupposeĈ is such that there is no expansion in G. This implies thatĈ ≤ 8M + l * 1 + 3. The P oA isĈ/C * which can be seen to be O( log L * M ). Conversely, if there is expansion we have the following: At depth 0, E 0 = 1, C 0 =Ĉ and P 0 =Ĉ − M since upto M players may have this edge as their optimal. As before C k =Ĉ − kl * − k and P k = E k C k . However, now E k the number of expansion edges at depth k becomes E k = P k−1 L * /M since upto M players can share the same optimal path. Using a similar derivation as before we get,
t=1 C t which after some algebraic manipulation leads to
Substituting κ =Ĉ/M and simplifying, we get l * log |E| ≥ C(log κ + l * − 1) which leads to κ(log(L * κ)) ≤ l * log |E| M
It can be seen that the P oA decreases with increasing optimal congestion M .
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we have considered exponential bottleneck games with player utility costs that are exponential functions on the congestion of the edges of the players paths. The social cost is C, the maximum congestion on any edge in the graph. We show that the price of anarchy is poly-log with respect to the size of the game parameters: O(log L · log |E|), where L is the largest path length in the players strategy sets, and E is the set of edges in the graph. Several questions remain to be investigated in the future. A natural question that arises is what is the impact of polynomial cost functions to the price of anarchy. Polynomial cost functions with low degree give high price of anarchy. Consider the game instance of Figure 2 where the player cost is pc i = e∈pi C e which is a linear function on the congestion of the edges on the player's path. In this game there k players π 1 , . . . , π k where all the players have source u and destination v which are connected by edge e. The graph consists of k − 1 edge-disjoint paths from u to v each of length k. There is a Nash equilibrium, depicted in the top of Figure 2 , where every player chooses to use a path of length 1 on edge e. This is an equilibrium because the cost of each player is k, while the cost of every alternative path is also k. Since the congestion of edge e is k the social cost is k. The optimal solution for the same routing problem is depicted in the bottom of Figure 2 , where every player uses a edge-disjoint path and thus the maximum congestion on any edge is 1. Therefore, the price of anarchy is at least k. Since we can choose k = Θ( √ n), where n is the number of nodes in the graph, the price of anarchy is Ω( √ n).
